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INTO THE ABYSS: HOW PARTY
AUTONOMY SUPPORTS OVERREACHING
THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF UNEQUAL
BARGAINING POWER
PAMELA EDWARDS*
Courts undertake a choice of law analysis when faced with
parties or transactions involving more than one jurisdiction. This
article reviews the current approaches courts use to settle general
choice of law' issues under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 2
and compares these approaches with those used under other rules
of law. This article also analyzes how proposed changes to the
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1. Black's Law Dictionary defines "choice of law" as "[tihe question of
which jurisdiction's law should apply in a given case." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 234 (7th ed. 1999).
2. An in-depth discussion of the specialized choice of law provisions of the
U.C.C. is beyond the scope of this article. These provisions are: §§ 2-402
(rights of creditors against sold goods); 2A-105 and 2A-106 (leases); 4-102
(bank deposits and collections); 4A-507 (funds transfers); 5-116 (letters of
credit); 6-103 (bulk sales); 8-110 (investment securities); and 9-301 through 9-
307 (secured transactions issues including perfection of security interests, pri-
ority of security interests and agricultural liens).
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U.C.C. comport with trends in choice of law jurisprudence support-
ing party autonomy, including a trend to ignore other jurisdictions'
fundamental public policy where the parties have incorporated a
choice of law clause in their agreement. This Article concludes
with the proposition that while the proposed revisions include
safeguards against several of the concerns raised by the trends in
choice of law jurisprudence, the underlying assumption of parity in
bargaining power between commercial entities remains imbedded
in the Code's choice of law provisions. This is illustrated in the
support for enforcing choice of law clauses in agreements, and
raises issues of fairness and equity where that underlying as-
sumption proves false.
The importance of the choice of law provisions of the U.C.C.
depends on whether the Code is widely enacted by the states, Na-
tive American nations," and territories4 of the United States. To
the extent that these jurisdictions enact the Code as drafted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute, choice of law provi-
sions become less important because under the Uniform Code,
there is no true conflict of law5 for "interstate"6 transactions cov-
ered by the code.7
However, history has shown that, at times, some jurisdictions
3. This article will return to this point in the discussion of Native Ameri-
can nations' versions of the U.C.C.. This article uses the term "Native Ameri-
can nations" to refer to those domestic dependent nations also called variously
"American Indian tribes," "American Indian nations," and "Native American
tribes," although federal regulations exist governing the extent to which these
domestic dependent nations can self govern. See Wheeler-Howard Act §§ 16,
17, 48 Stat. 987, 988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477 (2003) (detailing the organization
and incorporation of "Indian tribes"). See also Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dis-
pute Resolution and Promissory Obligations: Continuity and Change in the
Largest Native American Nation, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 4 n.8 (1993) (dis-
cussing Chief Justice Marshall's use of the term domestic dependent nations).
4. For example, both Guam and the Virgin Islands have adopted the
U.C.C., codified at title 13 of the Guam Code Annotated and title 11A of the
Virgin Islands Code Annotated, respectively. See 13 GUAM CODE ANN. §§
1101-10104 (2001); 11A V.I. CODE ANN. §§ 1-105-9-507 (2001). See generally
U.C.C. § 1-101 (1998).
5. A conflict of law arises where there is "[a] difference between the laws of
different states or countries in a case in which a transaction or occurrence cen-
tral to the case has a connection to two or more jurisdictions." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 295 (7th ed. 1999). Where there is no difference between the laws
of the states in question, it is called a false conflict. Id.
6. This article will use the term "interstate" to designate transactions that
involve more than one jurisdiction including states, Native American nations,
or territories of the United States.
7. See generally Corsica Coop. Ass'n v. Behlen Mfg. Co., Inc., 967 F. Supp.
382, 384 (D.S.D. 1997) (discussing the fact that where both relevant states
have adopted the same version of the U.C.C., no conflict of law exists). See
also infra notes 141-167 and accompanying text (discussing Native American
nations' and tribes' adoption of the U.C.C.).
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have chosen not to enact the Code as drafted by the NCCUSL.
Occasionally, some jurisdictions have chosen to make changes to
the drafted language or have delayed enacting particular code sec-
tions.9 For example, as of this writing, all of the states except New
York and South Carolina have enacted the revisions to Article 3
which were proposed in 1990.' 0 Furthermore, all of the states ex-
cept Massachusetts, New York, and South Carolina have enacted
the revisions to Article 4.11
To the extent that jurisdictions enact variations to the
NCCUSL drafted language and refuse to enact or delay in enact-
ing NCCUSL revisions or amendments, choice of law provisions
loom larger in importance. For example, while most of the states
have adopted the choice of law section promulgated by the
NCCUSL or with minor linguistic changes, Mississippi's version of
this section incorporates a substantive alteration, mandating inter
alia the application of Mississippi law to issues of U.C.C. Article 2
implied warranties." Similarly, some of the Native American na-
tions have enacted versions of the Code modified to reflect those
nations' customs and traditions.13 The choice of law rules come
into play when dealing with transactions between parties of Code
and non-Code jurisdictions. 4
8. Fred H. Miller, The State of the Uniform Commercial Code-2000, ALI-
ABA Course of Study, Nov. 16, 2000, SF 38 ALI-ABA 1, *4.
9. Id.
10. U.C.C. § 3-101 (1998). See, e.g., Miller, supra note 8, at *4 (noting that
New York and South Carolina declined to adopt the 1990 Article 3 revisions).
11. U.C.C. § 4-101 (1998).
12. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1998). The Mississippi variation provides:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the
parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state
or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement
this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this
state. Provided, however, the law of the State of Mississippi shall al-
ways govern the rights and duties of the parties in regard to disclaimers
of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness, or the necessity for
privity of contract to maintain a civil action for breach of implied war-
ranties of merchantability of fitness notwithstanding any agreement by
the parties that the laws of some other state or nation shall govern the
rights and duties of the parties.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-1-105 (2002).
13. See infra notes 147-167 and accompanying text (discussing the Native
American nations' versions of the U.C.C.)
14. Evans v. Harry Robinson Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 983 S.W.2d 946 (1999). A
choice of law issue may arise where the general provisions of a contract might
satisfy the laws of the jurisdiction in which both parties are domiciled, includ-
ing a choice of law clause selecting another jurisdiction's laws, but where an-
other provision of the contract violates a state law. Id. In Evans, the contract
violated Arkansas' usury laws, but the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that
the contract was valid under the laws of Texas. Id.
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I. CHOICE OF LAW UNDER THE CURRENT VERSION OF THE U.C.C.
Currently under the U.C.C., to minimize choice of law issues
arising in commercial disputes, the U.C.C. allows the parties to in-
clude a choice of law clause in their agreements.' 5 Once disputes
arise involving contracts governed by the U.C.C., section 1-105
sets out the standards for courts to apply in determining which ju-
risdiction's law should apply to the matter.'6
Section 1-105 of the Code, which applies to the other articles
of the U.C.C., currently provides, in pertinent part:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or
nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Fail-
ing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an ap-
propriate relation to this state. 7
Article 1 of the U.C.C., which sets forth the general provisions
of the Code, is being revised. One of the major proposed changes is
the choice of law section. 8 In August 2001, the NCCUSL recom-
mended that the states adopt revised Article 1. '9
A. Parties' Choice of Law Clauses
Where the parties' agreement incorporates a choice of law
clause, courts must decide whether the selected jurisdiction bears
a "reasonable relation" to the transaction. 20 The Code does not
specify the factors that constitute a reasonable relationship.
Comment one of section 1-105 states that "the test of reasonable
relation is similar to that laid down by the Supreme Court in See-
man v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., which states that the law
chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough
portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur or
occurs."2'
In Seeman, the Court rejected the view that the place of con-
tracting was the only dispositive factor to the determination of
15 U.C.C. § 1-105 (1998).
16 Id.
17. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1998). The following code sections provide the applica-
ble law under the U.C.C. in given particular factual situations: Sections 2-
403, 2A-105, 2A-106, 4-102, 4A-507, 5-116, 6-103, 8-110, and 9-301 through 9-
307. Id. "Where one of the following provisions of the Act specifies the appli-
cable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to
the extent permitted by the law, (including the conflict of laws rules) so speci-
fied." Id.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 238-58 and accompanying text for an analysis of the re-
vised U.C.C. choice of law provision.
20. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1998).
21. Id. (internal quotations omitted)
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which law applied 22. The issue in the case was whether the loan
transaction was usurious. The Court considered several factors to
determine whether New York or Pennsylvania law should apply to
the litigation.23 The factors that the Court considered included: (1)
the place of business of each party; (2) the place of incorporation of
the parties; (3) the place of performance (repayment of the loan);
and (4) the law selected in the parties' choice of law clause in the
agreement. 24 Because Pennsylvania's relationship with the trans-
action fell into several of these categories-i.e., the plaintiff was or-
ganized under the laws of Pennsylvania and had its only place of
business there, the loan agreement called for repayment in the
plaintiffs office in Pennsylvania, and the loan agreement selected
Pennsylvania law to govern questions of the validity of the con-
tract - the Court held that the application of Pennsylvania law was
proper. The Court made this determination even though New
York law might have otherwise been applicable 25 and that the loan
transaction violated New York's usury laws.26
Recent cases illustrate the application of the contacts cited by
the Court in Seeman that courts have held constitute a reasonable
relationship with the transaction. In Evans v. Harry Robinson
Pontiac-Buick, Inc. ,7 another case dealing with usury, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court enforced a choice of law provision that selected
Texas law to govern the agreement, even though the agreement
was usurious under Arkansas law and the debtor was an Arkansas
resident. In Evans, the court looked at several factors in finding
that Texas had a reasonable relationship to the transaction such
as: the place where the transaction originated; the place of per-
formance; the place where payments were to be made under the
agreement; and the location of the parties.28 One factor that the
Arkansas Supreme Court did not consider significant was that the
debtor was a consumer.2' The court found that, although the
22. 274 U.S. 403, 407-09 (1927).
23. Id. at 407-09.
24. Id. at 408-09.
25. Id. at 409.
26. Id. at 409. As for the question of usury, the Court found:
The general principle in relation to contracts made in one place, to be
executed in another, is well settled. They are to be governed by the law
of performance, and if the interest allowed by the laws of the place of
performance is higher than that permitted at the place of contract, the
parties may stipulate for the higher interest without incurring the pen-
alties of usury.
Id. at 407.
27. Evans, 983 S.W.2d at 946.
28. Id. at 950 (citing Arkansas Appliance Distributing Co. v. Tandy Elec-
tronics, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 899 (Ark. 1987)).
29. Id. In fact, this point is only mentioned obliquely in the opinion. When
discussing the facts of the case, the court noted that the parties signed a retail
installment contract. Id. at 947. Later in the opinion, when upholding the
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transaction originated in Arkansas and that two of the three par-
ties at the time of contracting were located in Arkansas, the lender
had its place of business in Texas and the debtor sent his pay-
ments to Texas.30 Therefore, Texas had a reasonable relationship
to the transaction." The court declined to apply the public policy
exception to invalidate the choice of law clause.32
Courts apply the Seeman factors to other types of agreements
under the U.C.C.33 In an Article 3 case involving a choice of law
clause pursuant to section 1-105, a New York state court cited sev-
eral of the Seeman factors in determining that New York bore a
reasonable relationship to a transaction involving partnership
note payments.34 In enforcing the choice of law clause on the part-
nership agreement, the court noted that (1) one of the parties to
the original transaction had its offices in New York; (2) all pay-
ments on the note were to be made in New York and payments
had been sent to that state for four years; and (3) the current note
holder, the plaintiff in the action, was headquartered in New
York.30
In a case involving a cause of action based on an Article 2
sales contract, a federal district court sitting in diversity found
that the residency of either of the parties (where the buyer resided
in one state and the seller in another), the place of performance of
the contract (Massachusetts), and the place where the goods were
held at the time of contracting (North Carolina), all constituted a
reasonable relationship with the transaction. 36  The court con-
cluded that either state's laws could have been applied to the liti-
gation had it been selected by the parties in a choice of law
clause.37
The relationship of the chosen state to the transaction does
not have to be stronger than, or even as strong as, the forum's re-
dismissal of consumer's federal truth-in-lending claim, the court merely cited
to the federal code section without discussing the nature of the claim. Id. at
951.
30. Id. at 950.
31. See id. (citing In re Brock, 214 B.R. 877 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997) and
establishing relevant factors in determining whether a state has a reasonable
relationship in the transaction).
32. Apparently the debtor did not raise this argument as the opinion is si-
lent on this point. Id. at 946. A few courts have used the public policy excep-
tion to invalidate a choice of law clause in agreements; most of these cases did
involve a consumer debtor. See Jersey Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper, 639 So.2d
664, 674 n.10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that this case concerns only
commercial parties)
33. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United Mo. Bank, N.A., 223 A.D.2d 119,
123 (App. Div. 1996).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Ward Transformer Co., Inc. v. Distrigas of Mass. Corp., 779 F. Supp.
823, 824 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
37. Id.
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lationship to the transaction. In Benedictine College., Inc. v. Cen-
tury Office Products, Inc. ,38 the court enforced the parties' choice of
law clause contained in an equipment lease.39 The choice of law
provision was enforced even though the forum had a stronger rela-
tionship with transaction.4" The Benedictine case illustrates the
tendency of courts to enforce choice of law clauses, despite strong
forum ties.41
B. Absence of Parties' Choice of Law Clauses
Where the parties have failed to include a choice of law clause
in their agreement, the courts apply the "appropriate relation"
standard.4" Comment three following section 1-105 states that
"[w]here a transaction has significant contacts with a state which
has enacted the [U.C.C.] and also with other jurisdictions, the
question [of] what relation is appropriate is left to judicial deci-
sion, and in deciding that question, the court is not strictly bound
by precedents established in other contexts."43 Furthermore, com-
ment two notes that
[T]he mere fact that suit is brought in a state does not make it ap-
propriate to apply the substantive law of that state. Cases where a
relation to the enacting state is not appropriate include, for exam-
ple, those where the parties have clearly contracted on the basis of
some other law, as where the law of the place of contracting and the
law of the place of contemplated performance are the same and con-
trary to the law under the Code.44
For example, in Trilogy Development Group, Inc. v. Teknowl-
edge Corp., a Delaware state court declined to apply Delaware's
substantive law to a case involving two corporations incorporated
under the laws of Delaware." The original agreement incluced a
choice of law clause.46 The court found it significant that neither
38. 853 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Kan. 1994).
39. Id. at 1323.
40. Id. Even though "[b]oth parties to the agreement are Kansas entities,
the agreement was executed in Kansas, and the equipment covered by the
agreement was located in Kansas," because one of the parties had an office in
Missouri and the assignees of the agreement were located in Missouri, the
court found that Missouri had a reasonable relationship with the transaction.
Id.
41. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative
Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 716 (2001) (noting
that the courts will usually enforce parties choice of law clauses).
42. Id.
43. U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 3 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).
44. Id. § 1-105 cmt. 2.
45. See Trilogy Dev. Group, Inc. v. Teknowledge Corp., No. CA 95C-09-158
SLD, 1996 WL 527325 (Del. Super. Aug. 20, 1996) (holding that the law of the
state which was the place of payment of a negotiable instrument should gov-
ern whether there was an accord and satisfaction).
46. Id. at*1.
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corporation had its principal place of business in Delaware. The
court found, however, that the dispute did not turn on questions of
corporate governance, but rather was a transaction under the
U.C.C.4" The court declined to enforce the parties' choice of law
clause selecting Pennsylvania law, holding that Pennsylvania no
longer "had any material connection" to the transaction under
Delaware choice of law rules.48
A review of reported opinions under section 1-105 shows that
many courts who hear cases where the parties did not incorporate
a choice of law clause find that the forum bears an appropriate re-
lationship with the transaction.49 This is not surprising given that
the drafters included this "forum-favoring" rule to encourage ju-
risdictions to enact the Code.5 °
II. CHOICE OF LAW IN NON-U.C.C. CONTRACTS GOVERNED BY
STATE LAW
Similar to issues involving contracts governed by the U.C.C.,
one of the first questions courts must determine when faced with a
potential choice of law issue in matters involving contracts not
governed by the U.C.C. is whether the parties have included a
choice of law clause in their agreement."1 Courts' enforcement of
party autonomy in selecting the applicable law to govern their
agreement is well grounded in the history of commercial law. 2 For
example, the law merchant was founded on the principle that the
parties were in the best position to determine the most efficient
processes for commercial transactions." However, the nature of
commerical transactions has changed over time and with the addi-
tion of the U.C.C.. These changes give rise to doubts as to the con-
tinuing validity of party autonomy.
A. Choice of Law Clauses in Agreements
Similar to contracts governed by the U.C.C., courts also gen-
erally enforce choice of law clauses in non-U.C.C. agreements.
47. Id. at *4
48. Id.
49. See Kathleen Patchel and Boris Auerbach, Symposium on Revised Arti-
cle 1 and Proposed Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Article 1
Revision Process, 54 SMU L. REV. 603, 612-13 (2001).
50. See id. (noting that the revised rule no longer requires a forum-favoring
rule).
51. See generally Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory So-
lution to a Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471, 472-79 (1989) (dis-
cussing the historic development of rules allowing parties to choose the law
applicable to their agreements).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187.
53. See generally Richard K. Greenstein, Is the Proposed U.C.C. Choice of
Law Provision Unconstitutional?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2000).
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Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 4 di-
rects courts to first decide whether the dispute involves an issue of
the type that the parties had the authority to resolve in their
agreement.5 Issues that the parties customarily do not have the
authority to resolve in their agreement include "capacity, formali-
ties, substantial validity and illegality."" If the parties could have
resolved the particular issue in their agreement, then courts ad-
hering to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law will enforce
the parties' choice of law clause without further inquiry."
Courts still may enforce the clause in situations where the
parties did not have the authority to resolve the issue in their
agreement.58 In those situations, section 187 directs courts to en-
force the parties' choice of law clause unless one of two conditions
apply: (1) if the chosen jurisdiction fails the substantial relation-
ship test; or (2) if the public policy exception applies. 9 Further-
more, courts also enforce choice of law clauses in boiler-plate con-
tracts of adhesion.60 Generally, these cases have concerned choice
of law clauses in cruise tickets' and other pre-printed tickets."
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187. If the parties
chose a state's laws to apply to the contract, that chosen state will apply if the
issue is one which the parties could have addressed by including an explicit
provision in the agreement. Id. However, the chosen state's laws will still be
applied even if the issue could not have been addressed by an explicit provi-
sion unless the jurisdiction chosen fails the substantial relationship test or the
public policy exception applies. Id.
55. Id.
56. Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 132 (7th Cir. 1990).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. d. (1989).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1).
58. Id. §187(2).
59. Id. §187(2) (a) & (b).
60. See Milanovich v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 954 F.2d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (enforcing choice of law clause in contract of adhesion pre-printed on
cruise ticket); Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir.
1955) (upholding choice of law provision in adhesion contract). See also Carni-
val Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596-97 (1991) (enforcing forum
selection clause printed in cruise ticket); Chapman v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Ltd., No. 01 C 50004, 2001 WL 910102 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 6, 2001) (discussing
Congress' actions subsequent to Shute, and holding that Shute is still good
law); DeNicola v. Cunard Line Ltd., 642 F.2d 5, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1981) (enforc-
ing a period of limitation pre-printed on a cruise ticket).
61. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 197, Re-
porter's Note (1971) (providing that with respect to transportation contracts,
the parties' express choice of law is valid subject to consideration of the factors
stated in section 187). "[However], on occasion, the courts have stated that a
choice-of-law provision in a ticket providing for the transportation of passen-
gers is but one factor to be considered in determining the state of the applica-
ble law on the ground that tickets should be considered to be contracts of ad-
hesion." Id.
62. See Driscoll v. State Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Lottery, 627 A.2d 1167,
1172 (1993) (rejecting breach of contract claim where lottery ticket clearly
stated that it was valid only for a drawing on a specified date in the future, as
20031
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This result is supported by the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Law as well.63 In fact, section 187(2) has been interpreted as
supporting the enforcement of choice of law clauses in contracts of
adhesion. 4
B. Choice of Law by State Statute
Several states have enacted statutes that allow parties to se-
lect that state's laws in an agreement, even where the state bears
no other relationship to the transaction. This section of the Article
analyzes several of those statutes, as codified in these states'
codes.6" Most of these code sections set a minimum threshold dol-
lar amount for transactions to be governed by the provisions, rang-
ing from a low of $100,000 in Delaware,6 to a maximum of
$1,000,000 in Texas. The typical threshold is $250,000 for par-
ties' choice of law clauses to be upheld.6 The codes of Louisiana,
Ohio, and Oregon fail to set a minimum threshold transactional
dollar amount. 9
Many of these code sections exclude contracts involving con-
sumer transactions,"6 and employment and personal services con-
opposed to the drawing completed minutes before the purchase, two hours ear-
lier than the "normal" drawing time).
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1) (1981). Section
211 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to be-
lieve that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of agree-
ments of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated agree-
ment with respect to the terms included in the writing.
Id.
64. See Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1079 (Cal.)
(2001) (citing section 187(2) for proposition that choice of law clauses in con-
tracts of adhesion are as enforceable as those clauses are in freely negotiated
agreements).
65. Many states have enacted such provisions as part of their enactment of
uniform laws. This section will not discuss those provisions.
66. DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 6 § 2708 (c) (2002).
67. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 38.51 (2A) (West 2002).
68. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West 2003) (requiring that the
agreement be no less than $250,000 for this section to apply); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6 § 2708 (2002) (requiring that the agreement be no less than $100,000 for
this section to apply); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101 (West 2002) (requiring that
the agreement be no less than $250,000 for this section to apply); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(West 2003) (requiring that the agreement be no less
than $250,000 for this section to apply); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51
(West 2002) (requiring that the agreement be no less than $1,000,000 for this
section to apply).
69. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 3540 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.30 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 81.125 (2001).
70. "Consumer" transactions are generally considered to be transactions
primarily for "personal, family, or household purposes." See, e.g., CAL. CIV
CODE § 1646.5 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101 (West 2002); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (West 2003) (excluding contracts for personal, family or
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tracts from coverage under these provisions.71 Generally, these
provisions explicitly confirm the supremacy of the enacting state's
version of U.C.C. section 1-105(2), which sets out the specific
choice of law provisions for particular types of transactions gov-
erned by the U.C.C.. This part of the Article also examines in
depth the Texas provision,73 which arguably provides the broadest
support for party autonomy. Some of these code sections apply
only when the parties' choice of law does not offend the public pol-
icy of the jurisdiction whose law would apply absent the clause in
the agreement 4 while others apply even if another jurisdiction's
public policy would be offended.75
1. California"
The California Civil Code contains a section, originally en-
acted in 1986, that enables parties to include a choice of law clause
in their agreement.7 The following types of agreements are ex-
cluded from coverage under this section: (1) transactions under
$250,000; (2) contracts involving consumer goods; and (3) employ-
ment and personal services contracts.8
2. Delaware
The Delaware Code allows parties to transactions worth
$100,000 or more to select Delaware law to apply to all or part of
their agreement, even where choice of law principles might require
household services under the above sections).
71. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §
2708 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101 (West 2001); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
5-1401 (McKinney 2001); and OR. REV. STAT. § 81.135 (2001) (excluding con-
tracts for labor or personal services under the above sections).
72. Id.
73. See infra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the Texas code sec-
tion).
74. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 3540 (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 81.125
(2001).
75. See TEX. BUS. & COM. § 35.51 (2001). See also Sun Forest Corp. v.
Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (validating the method ignor-
ing the fact that the parties' choice contravenes a jurisdiction's public policy
and interpreting the New York Codes' section as validating the parties' choice
of law clause including where it contravenes the public policy of another juris-
diction even though it is silent on the matter); Supply & Bldg. Co. v. Estee
Lauder Int'l, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8136(RCC), 2000 WL 223838, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 25, 2000) (holding that New York's code allows choice of law even when it
contradicts with public policy).
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West 2002).
77. Id. This section provides that under California law, parties to a con-
tract over $250,000 can choose to have California law apply it regardless of
whether there is a reasonable relationship with the state. Id. See also Fried-
ler, supra note 51, at 496, n. 136 (discussing the legislative history of the Act).
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West 2002).
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application of another jurisdiction's law. 9 The language of the
statutory enactment parallels the substantial relationship re-
quirement of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law by pro-
viding that such a selection "shall conclusively be presumed to be a
significant, material and reasonable relationship with this State
and shall be enforced whether or not there are other relationships
with this State.""
3. Florida
In 1989, Florida enacted a choice of law statute codified in the
state's chapter on contract enforcement.81 Although the Florida
code section uses language similar to those of the other states that
are discussed in this part of the Article," it carves out broad excep-
tions to the section's applicability, including contracts involving
consumer transactions,83 and employment contracts. 4 The broad-
est exception, however, contradicts the purpose for which most
other states have enacted this type of statute. This exception re-
moves from the code section's coverage situations where none of
the parties are domiciled in Florida and "any transaction which
does not bear a substantial or reasonable relation to [Florida]."""
4. Louisiana
Louisiana has a comprehensive and unique statutory scheme
addressing choice of law issues.86 In 1991, the Louisiana legisla-
ture overhauled the state's choice of law statutes. 7 Several differ-
ent articles of the Louisiana code apply to party autonomy with re-
spect to choice of law clauses.8 While the Louisiana code
acknowledges that parties have the right to select the law to apply
to their agreement in principle,89 this right is limited. -Questions of
whether the form of the agreement is valid or whether the parties
have the capacity to contract, and therefore have the capacity to
include a choice of law clause in their agreement, are covered by
Articles 3538 and 3539 of the Louisiana Civil Code respectively. °
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (2001).
80. Id.
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101 (West 2001).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 685.101(2)(c).
84. Id. § 685.101(2)(b).
85. Id. § 685.101(2)(a).
86. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 14 and 3515 (West 2001) (noting that
choice of law conflicts are resolved by evaluating the strength and pertinence
of all the relevant policies of all states involved).
87. See id. art. 14 (discussing Act 1991, No. 923 which became effective on
January 1, 1992).
88. Id. art. 3537.
89. Id. art. 3540 cmt. f.
90. Id. arts. 3538 & 3539.
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Article 3540 restricts the parties' ability to select the law govern-
ing their agreement where "that law contravenes the public policy
of the state whose law would otherwise be applicable [in the ab-
sence of the parties' choice of law clause]. "" However, none of
these code sections apply to personal property leases, insurance
agreements or consumer transactions; all of which are covered by
specific provisions elsewhere in Louisiana statutory law.92 The
Louisiana Consumer Protection Law invalidates any clause in an
agreement that (1) chooses the law of a state other than Louisiana;
(2) documents the consumer's consent subject to jurisdiction in a
state other than Louisiana; or (3) selects venue.93
5. New York
In 1984, New York enacted a broad choice of law provision as
part of its general contract law.9 4 Section 5-1401 of the General
Obligations Law provides that parties to transactions worth at
least $250,000 may select New York law to govern all or part of
their agreement.95 Exempt from this provision are employment
and other personal services contracts, and contracts involving con-
sumer transactions.96 This code section, and its companion code
section regarding forum selection clauses choosing New York as
the forum,97 has been construed as an attempt by New York to "se-
cure and augment its reputation as a center of international com-
merce"9 '8 by enabling its courts to hear cases and apply New York
law to such cases pursuant to the parties' intent.99
91. Id. art. 3540. The Article provides: "All other issues of conventional
obligations are governed by the law expressly chosen or clearly relied upon by
the parties, except to the extent that law contravenes the public policy of the
state whose law would otherwise be applicable under Article 3537." Id.
92. Id. art. 3537.
93. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1418 (West 2001).
94. L.1984, c. 421 legislation. See Friedler, supra note 51, at 496-99 (dis-
cussing the legislative history of the Act).
95. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2001).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 5-1402.
98. Radioactive J.V. v. Manson, 153 F. Supp.2d 462, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(quoting Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals Int'l Non-Fervous
Metals Trading Co., No. 94 Civ 8301, 2000 WL 1702039, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
13, 2000)). See also Marine Midland Bank, 223 A.D.2d at 124 (noting that
New York has an interest in maintaining its position as a commercial and fi-
nancial capital).
99. Radioactive, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 470-71. Given broad pronouncements of
New York policies that are found in several cases, enacting this choice of law
provision was the next logical step. For example, the court in Marine Midland
Bank stated that "[New York has a] recognized interest in maintaining and
fostering its undisputed status as the preeminent commercial and financial
nerve center of the Nation and the world." Marine Midland Bank, 223 A.D.2d
at 124. See also Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.E.2d 372,
581-82 (N.Y. 1969) (discussing New York's choice of law provisions).
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6. Ohio
Ohio treats party autonomy in selecting the law governing
their agreement not with a direct grant of authority to do so, but
with a mandate under its Long Arm Statute, amended in 1991 to
enforce such a choice of law.' °° The Ohio Code provides in perti-
nent part that "any person may bring a civil action in a court of
this state ... upon a cause of action that arise out of or relates to
a[n] ... agreement... whether or not it bears a reasonable rela-
tion to this state, if the agreement contains" both a choice of law
clause selecting Ohio law and a clause consenting to jurisdiction in
Ohio. 0 ' The code section further admonishes state courts not to
stay or dismiss a cause of action brought under this section and to
apply Ohio law.' 2  This provision does not apply to consumer
transactions or employment or personal services contracts.' 2
7. Oregon
Oregon allows parties to include choice of law clauses in
agreements, including modifying existing agreements to include or
change a choice of law clause"4 with certain limitations. Similar to
the Louisiana provision discussed earlier, the Oregon provision in-
validates parties' choice of law clauses that would violate the fun-
damental policies of the state whose law would govern in the ab-
sence of the choice of law clause."' Oregon law also invalidates
choice of law clauses that would either prohibit a party from per-
forming an act required by the jurisdiction where the contract is to
be performed, or require a party to do an act prohibited by the ju-
risdiction where the contract is to be performed.' 0 Most agree-
ments involving consumer transactions are exempt from this
choice of law provision, 7 as are real property contracts, personal
service contracts, contracts for franchises, licensing contracts, and
agency contracts.'°s
100. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.39 (West 2001).
101. See id. (noting that the parties agreement must state that Ohio law ap-
plies and that the parties will submit to Ohio jurisdiction).
102. Id. § 2307.39(B).
103. Id. § 2307.39(C).
104. See OR. REV. STAT. § 81.120 (2001) (providing that the choice of law
may be modified by express agreement after the parties enter into the con-
tract).
105. Id. § 81.125.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 81.105(A). The choice of law provision does not apply to consumer
agreements where "[tihe consumer is a resident of Oregon at the time of con-
tracting; and [tihe consumer's assent to the contract is obtained in Oregon, or
the consumer is induced to enter into the contract in substantial measure by
an invitation or advertisement in Oregon." Id.
108. See id. § 81.135 (noting that choice of law clauses may not contravene
an established fundamental policy embodied in the law that would otherwise
govern the issue in dispute).
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8. Texas
The Texas Code advances the concept of party autonomy more
than any of the analogous statutes from other states in one re-
spect. The relevant code section validates parties' choice of law
clauses, including where the parties choose the law of a jurisdic-
tion other than Texas, even if the jurisdiction bears no reasonable
relationship to the transaction. °9 The code section provides, in
pertinent part, that with certain exceptions
If the parties to a qualified transaction agree in writing that the law
of a particular jurisdiction governs the interpretation or construc-
tion of an agreement relating to the transaction or a provision of the
agreement, the law, other than conflict of laws rules, of that juris-
diction governs that issue regardless of whether the transaction
bears a reasonable relation to that jurisdiction."'
Furthermore, the Texas code validates the parties' choice of
law clauses even where a jurisdiction's fundamental public policy
would be contravened. The code provides that
If the parties to a qualified transaction agree in writing that the law
of a particular jurisdiction governs an issue relating to the transac-
tion, including the validity or enforceability of an agreement relat-
ing to the transaction or a provision of the agreement, and the
transaction bears a reasonable relation to that jurisdiction, the law,
other than conflict of laws rules, of that jurisdiction governs the is-
sue regardless of whether the application of that law is contrary to a
fundamental or public policy of this state or of any other jurisdic-
tion."'
There are several limitations to this code section. First, the
threshold amount required for the section to apply must be at least
$1 million."' This requirement is referred to as "a qualified trans-
action."' There are other exceptions to this broad choice of law
rule, including certain real property transactions, agreements in-
volving marriage and custody issues, and wills."4 Construction
contracts are governed by the separate provisions of section
35.52.""
C. Absence of Parties' Choice of Law Clauses
Where the parties have not made a choice of law selection in
their agreement, courts will apply their jurisdiction's choice of law
rules. Most states follow either the Restatement (First) of Conflict
109. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (Vernon 2001).
110. Id. § 35.51(c).
111. Id. § 35.51(b).
112. Id. § 35.51(2)(a)-(b).
113. Id.
114. Id. § 35.51(f).
115. Id. § 35.52.
2003]
The John Marshall Law Review
of Laws, known as the traditional choice of law theory or the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, known as the modern
choice of law theory.11 6
The modern choice of law theory adopts an approach similar
to the government interest test."' Courts that use the government
interest analysis approach to choice of law consider whether juris-
dictions whose laws could be applied to a dispute have an interest
in having their laws applied."1 8 Government interests that have
been considered sufficient to warrant the application of the law of
the forum include: (1) the state's interest in maintaining its posi-
tion as "a financial capital of the world;"" 9 (2) the state's interest in
economic development;1 20 and (3) the state's "interests in the en-
forcement of its regulatory scheme. 1 2 ' The Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws partially embodies this approach when deter-
mining whether the forum bears an appropriate relationship to the
transaction. 122
116. John. J. Harte, Validity of a State Court's Exercise of Concurrent Juris-
diction Over Civil Actions Arising in Indian Country: Application of the Indian
Abstention Doctrine in State Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63, 95 (1997).
117. Id. at 94.
118. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y.
1993) (noting New York's interest in applying its statute).
119. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 227
(1975). See Marine Midland Bank, 223 A.D.2d at 124 (recognizing New York's
interest in remaining a key financial center). See also EUGENE F. SCOLES, ET
AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.6, at 872 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that "[Authorizing
parties to select unrelated New York law] afford[s] parties the opportunity to
select a sophisticated body of commercial law and a judicial system with sub-
stantial experience as well as to enhance the importance of New York as an
international commercial center").
120. See Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 576,
583 (N.Y. 1969) (applying New York law to protect foreign principals against
unsupported claims for brokers fees to encourage foreign investment).
121. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins., 613 N.E.2d at 940 (discussing both private
parties and New York state's interest in having its laws and regulations apply
to a transaction).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 188 (1971). Section
188 provides:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in con-
tract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to
that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and
the parties under the principles stated in section 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see s 187),
the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of sec-
tion 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
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In determining the interests of the relevant jurisdictions, the
court must determine whether the dispute raises a true or false
conflict.12 Where a false conflict exists, courts will apply the law of
the jurisdiction with the interest in having its law applied to the
dispute. '24 Where a true conflict exists, courts will apply the law of
the jurisdiction "with the most significant relationship to [each
major] issue" in dispute."'
A similar approach is the "most intimate contacts test for
choice of law." 6 Under the most intimate contacts test, courts
consider which jurisdiction has a relationship to the parties and
the transaction. In making this determination, courts often look to
whether the parties have selected that state's law in a choice of
law clause."'
Another theory courts use to decide choice of law issues in
non-Code cases is the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts"
theory."8 Under this theory, the significant contacts that are
heavily weighted in a contract dispute include: (1) the place of con-
tracting; (2) the place of negotiation; (3) the place of performance;
(4) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (5) the
domicile of the contracting parties. 12 9 These factors are the same
that were used under the traditional choice of law approach. 3 °
(d) the location of the subject matter of the
contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative impor-
tance with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance
are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied,
except as otherwise provided in sections 189-199 and 203.
Id.
123. Morris v. SSE, Inc., 912 F.2d 1392, 1395 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing
government interest approach to choice of law analysis before finding that
Alabama adheres to traditional lex loci contractus).
124. Id.
125. Id. (emphasis added). A true conflict exists where the laws of the states
involved differ. See People v. Nieto, 746 N.Y.S. 2d 371, 374, n.2 (NY Supp.
2002).
126. Wright-Moore Corp., 908 F.2d at 132 (internal quotation omitted) (dis-
cussing Indiana's choice of law rules).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins., 613 N.E.2d at 940 (explaining that the "cen-
ter of gravity" or "grouping of contracts" choice of law theory allows a court to
decide which law to apply without worrying about policy issues).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
130. See In re Allstate Ins., 613 N.E.2d at 940 (analyzing different choice of
law approaches).
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The center of gravity or grouping of contacts approach allows
courts to decide which law should apply to litigation without hav-
ing to undertake a policy analysis."'
III. CHOICE OF LAW RULES FOR CONTRACTS GOVERNED BY NATIVE
AMERICAN LAW
Native American nations are an often forgotten "third cate-
gory of governmental entity" in the United States.'32 Native
American nations have the authority to regulate activities within
their own borders, to varying degrees.'33 Generally, the laws
passed by Native American nations govern relationships among
members of the Nation living on tribal land as well as relation-
ships between members and non-members who transact business
on tribal land."3 Tribal courts exist to hear disputes under tribal
law and they often use choice of law provisions to decide which
law-tribal, federal, or state-to apply to the dispute. 13' Although
all tribal courts must apply dispositive tribal and federal law, the
tribal codes'36 of Native American nations vary in the hierarchies
131. Id. "The center of gravity or grouping of contacts choice of law theory
applied in contracts cases enables the court to identify which law to apply
without entering into the difficult, and sometimes inappropriate, policy
thicket." (internal quotations omitted).
132. Wendy Collins Perdue, Conflicts and Dependent Sovereigns: Incorporat-
ing Indian Tribes into a Conflicts Course, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 675, 675 (1996).
133. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959) (noting that the states
have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on reservations); Babbitt Ford,
Inc. v. The Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that
although Native American nations have been recognized as sovereign entities,
this sovereignty is limited to a certain extent by certain treaty provisions); see
generally, Wheeler-Howard Act §§ 16, 17, 48 Stat. 987, 988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476,
477 (2000) (discussing the organization and incorporation of Indian Tribes).
134. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 219-20 (noting that the Cherokee nation is a
distinct community, occupying its own territory and laws); Babbitt Ford, 710
F.2d at 592 (noting that Native American nations "retain the inherent sover-
eign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
their reservations"). However, on occasion, Congress has given states the
power to regulate activities on tribal land. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 220. (cit-
ing sections in the federal code in which Congress vested New York, Califor-
nia, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin with this power). See
Robert B. Porter, Note, The Jurisdictional Relationship Between the Iroquois
and New York State: An Analysis of 25. U.S.C. §§ 232, 233, 27 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 497 (1990) (discussing federal legislation granting New York State par-
tial criminal and civil jurisdiction over Iroquois territory in the State). Section
232 grants New York State courts criminal jurisdiction over offenses commit-
ted on tribal land while section 233 grants the state courts civil jurisdiction. 25
U.S.C. §§ 232, 233 (2000).
135. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the
Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 299 (discuss-
ing tribal courts' use of tribal code choice of law provisions).
136. The term "tribal code" is used in this article to refer to the compilation
of Native American nations' laws. See Tribal Court Clearinghouse, Tribal
Codes & Constitutions, available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/
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they set out for applying these laws.137 Many tribal codes instruct
courts to apply state law where tribal law is silent on the issue,
unless the application of state law would offend traditional tribal
customs.138 This reference to state law may create additional
choice of law issues where the borders of tribal land overlap state
borders,"' or in other situations where more than one state mayhave an interest in having its laws applied to the transaction. 140
A. U.C.C. Choice of Law Provisions in Tribal Codes
Whether, and how, the U.C.C. applies to members of Native
American nations varies based on tribal law and on the existence
of a Congressional delegation of regulatory power over Native
American nations and their members to states on certain issues
and tribal law."' A growing number of Native American nations
have adopted some or all of the U.C.C. The most commonly
adopted articles are articles 1, 2, and 9.142 Some of the tribal codes
include the U.C.C. choice of law provisions, which may require
tribal courts to apply a law other than the tribal code for the na-
tion.' While most of the provisions incorporated into the tribal
codes are substantially similar to the versions promulgated by the
NCCUSL. One common variation is the prohibition against, or
limitation of, self-help repossession by secured parties after the
debtor defaults.'44 This limitation may present a true conflict
codes.htm (last accessed April 8, 2003).
137. Newton, supra note 135, at 299.
138. See id. at 299-302 (discussing choice of law rules in tribal codes); See
also Paul E. Frye, Lender Recourse in Indian Country: a Navajo Case Study,
21 N.M. L. REV. 275, 301 (1991) (Navajo Nation code directs courts to look to
state law on issues where no Navajo law exists).
139. See Frye, supra note 138, at 301 (noting that as Navajo "Indian Coun-
try" territory consists of land in Arizona, New Mexico and Utah, differences in
these states codifications of the U.C.C. articles not incorporated in the Navajo
Nation Code may be significant).
140. Id.
141. See Harte, supra note 116, at 63 (proposing that states refuse to exer-
cise concurrent jurisdiction). Arguably, such exercise of concurrent jurisdiction
by state courts (a) infringes on tribal sovereignty and (b) is preempted by fed-
eral law. Id.
142. See Tribal Legal Code Project, a project of HUD's Office of Native
American Programs, at http://www.tribal-institute.org/codes/part-seven.htm
(last visited April 8, 2003) (suggesting to tribal governments that they adopt
these articles at a bear minimum to support economic development). The goal
of the project is to provide legal information to tribal governments. Id. The
website also contains a list of Native American nations believed to have en-
acted portions of the U.C.C. Id.
143. See id. (discussing individual tribal codes).
144. See Tribal Legal Code Project, a project of HUD's Office of Native
American Programs, at http://www.tribal-institute.org/codes/part-seven.htm
(last visited April 8, 2003) (discussing historic problems Native American na-
tions have faced with creditors entering tribal lands when repossessing per-
sonal property). See Babbitt Ford, 710 F.2d at 587 (noting that the Native
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situation should the question of whether another jurisdiction's
laws should apply to the transaction arise.1
1. Navajo Nation
146
In 1986 the Navajo Nation adopted versions of U.C.C. Articles
1, 2, 3, and 9.147 Under Navajo law, Navajo courts have jurisdiction
over civil actions where the defendant is a resident of the Navajo
Nation or over defendants whose activities have affected the Na-
vajo Nation.148 The drafters crafted from the standard U.C.C. a
version that reflects the customs of the Navajo people. For exam-
ple, the Navajo U.C.C. exempts barter transactions from coverage
under the U.C.C.' 49 In adopting portions of the U.C.C., the Tribal
Council of the Navajo Nation elected to adopt the choice of law
provisions under section 1-105, which would require Navajo tribal
courts to uphold a choice of law election clause in a contract and
apply the version of the U.C.C. adopted by the selected state, as
opposed to the Navajo U.C.C." ° This fact assumes greater signifi-
cance when you consider two important variations contained in
the Navajo U.C.C.: the aforementioned barter exclusion in Article
2 and the preclusion of Article 9 self-help repossession.
The exclusion in section 1-110 of the Navajo U.C.C. for barter
transactions contradicts section 2-304(1) of the U.C.C. as promul-
American nations' power to restrict repossession activities on tribal land by
non-members has been upheld in federal courts).
145. See supra note 125 for a definition of "true conflict."
146. For a discussion of the history and organization of Navajo government
structure and its political system, see Frye, supra note 138, at 276-89.
147. NATION CODE tit. 5A §§ 1-101 to 9-507 (1986).
148. Id. 7 § 253 cited in Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute Resolution and
Promissory Obligations: Continuity and Change in the Largest Native Nation,
18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 39 n.232 (1993).
149. NATION CODE tit. 5A § 1-110 (1986). This code section provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code to the contrary, this
Code shall not apply to any exclusively barter transaction in which the
aggregate market value of all the goods and services involved in the
transaction does not exceed $10,000 at the time of the transaction. Such
transactions shall be governed by the customs and usages of the Navajo
Nation.
Id. When one considers the importance that barter transactions play in the
Navajo Nation, one can understand why the drafters felt that these transac-
tions should be governed by tribal custom. See Lieder, supra note 148, at 19 n.
87 (discussing historic reliance on barter transactions by the Navajo people).
150. NATION CODE tit. 5A § 1-105 (1986). This section provides, in pertinent
part:
Except as provided hereafter in this section when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to the Navajo Nation and also to another state or
nation, the parties may agree that the law either of the Navajo nation or
of such state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such
agreement, this Code applies to transactions bearing an appropriate re-
lation to the Navajo Nation.
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gated by the NCCUSL. Before turning to section 2-304, one must
first look to the Article 2 definition of "sale," which is "the passing
of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." 1 ' Section 2-304(1)
provides, in pertinent part, that "[tihe price can be made payable
in money or otherwise." 2 Courts have interpreted this language
as meaning that barter transactions are sales.' 3
One of the secured party's benefits under Article 9 is the abil-
ity to use self-help repossession. Under section 9-609 (formerly
section 9-503) secured parties may take possession of the collateral
without judicial process, if they can do so without the risk of vio-
lence. 5 4 Under the Navajo U.C.C., however, a secured party can-
not use self-help repossession of personal property where the de-
faulting debtor is a Navajo Indian."' Thus, these two variations156
in the Navajo U.C.C. present the potential for a true conflict of
laws.
2. Oneida Indian Nation
The Oneida Indian Nation has enacted Articles One and Two
of the U.C.C." 7 Unlike the Navajo Nation, the Oneida U.C.C. is
substantially similar to the standard version of the U.C.C., includ-
ing its choice of law provisions under section 1-105.,"
3. Fort Peck Tribes"'
The Fort Peck Tribal Government has enacted a version of
151. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1998).
152. Id. § 2-304(1) (emphasis added).
153. See Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool Co., Inc., 181 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1098 (4th
Dist. 1989) (finding that a barter is considered a sale under the U.C.C.); Mar-
tin v. Melland's Inc., 283 N.W.2d 76, 81 (N.D. 1979) (noting that where a car is
traded in, this is a sale for purposes of the U.C.C.).
154. U.C.C. § 9-609 (2002). Section 9-609 provides, in pertinent part, that
"[a]fter default, a secured party may take possession of the collateral ... with-
out judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace." Id.
155. NATION CODE tit. 5A §§ 9-503 (1986).
156. For a discussion of all of the variations between the Navajo U.C.C. and
the version promulgated by the NCCUSL, see Frye, supra note 138.
157. A copy is on file with the author, who thanks Wendy S. Fisher, Court
Clerk of the Oneida Nation Court, for providing this copy.
158. ONEIDA U.C.C. § 1-105 (1997). This code section provides:
Except as provided hereafter in the section, where a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to the Oneida Indian Nation and also to another
state or Indian Nation the parties may agree that the law either of the
Oneida Indian Nation or of such other state or Indian Nation shall gov-
ern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Code applies to
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to the Nation.
Id.
159 The Fort Peck Tribes consists of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the
Fort Peck Indian Reservation. Fort Peck Tribal Code U.C.C., Title XXIV §
111(47), available at http://www.ftpeckcourts.org/CCOJ/Title024.html (last
visited Feb. 11, 2003).
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the U.C.C. that incorporates some of the provisions of the U.C.C.
promulgated by the NCCUSL, but not its choice of law provisions
under section 1-105.'6o The code directs the tribal courts to "give
binding effect to and utilize only the most recent copyrighted ver-
sion of the U.C.C., whenever such version is revised and re-
printed.. 6.
4. Hoopa Valley Tribe
On June 8, 1998, the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council approved
enactment of the U.C.C..62 The Hoopa Valley U.C.C. incorporates
many of the provisions of Articles 1 and 9.163 The most significant
variations, similar to those found in the Navajo Code, are the bar-
ter exclusion' 64 and the prohibition of self-help repossession by se-
cured parties. '
5. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe
The Tribal Council Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe adopted
selected sections of Articles 1, 2, and 9 of the 1995 version of the
U.C.C. and incorporated them by reference into the Sisseton-
Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Code.'66 Included in this adoption is the
choice of law provisions of section 1-105."67 Unlike some of the
other tribal codes discussed in this part of the Article, the
Sisseston-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Code does not prohibit self-help
repossession, and incorporates the self-help provisions of Article 9
without modification.
160. Id. Similar to the Navajo Nation, the Fort Peck Tribal Code prohibits
self-help repossession.
161. Id.
162. Hoopa Valley Tribal Council Ordinance No. 11-98, available at
http://www.ncidc.org/codes/title-57.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2003). The
U.C.C. was codified as title 57 of the Hoopa Tribal Code. Id.
163. Hoopa Valley Tribal Code title 57, available at
http://www.ncidc.org/codes/title-57.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
164. Id. § 57.1.110. The code section provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Title to the contrary, this
Title shall not apply to any exclusively barter transaction in which the
market value of all the goods and services involved in the transaction
does not exceed $5,000.00. Such transactions shall be governed by the
customs and traditions of the Tribe or other applicable process.
Id.
165. Id. § 57.2.608. This Code section provides, in pertinent part, that
"[ulnless otherwise agreed, a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession, a secured party must either
obtain the consent of the debtor when the default occurs or obtain a judicial
order of repossession." Id.
166. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Code Chapter 69 (1996) available at,
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/sisseton-wahpeton-
codeoflaw69.htm (last visited March 9, 2003). The U.C.C. is codified as sec-
tions 69-01-01 through 69-23-01 of the Tribal Code.
167. Id. § 69-09-01-105.
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IV. CHOICE OF LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS
Despite calls for the federal government to step into the
choice of law arena to create a unified body of law,'68 neither Con-
gress nor the federal courts have accepted the call to the extent
desired by proponents of this approach. Much to the chagrin of
these proponents of the development of wide ranging federal choice
of law rules, it is well settled law that federal courts sitting in di-
versity must apply the whole law'69 of the forum state, 7° including
that state's choice of law rules. 7' However, where choice of law
questions arise in cases governed by federal law, federal courts
apply federal common law choice of law rules.'72
168. See, e.g., Daniel C. K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of Interna-
tional Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74
IOWA L. REV. 165, 169 (1988) (proposing that federal common law of choice of
law should replace state law because of the effect that choice of law jurispru-
dence bears on the United State's foreign affairs and other international inter-
ests); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Fed-
eral Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991) (suggesting federal choice of
law rules for multi-state issues); Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing
Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715 (1992) (discussing history of federal
choice of law jurisprudence and stating the need for a single overriding rule
for interstate and multi-state transactions).
169. The term "whole law" includes not only the local law of a jurisdiction,
but also its choice of law rules. See, e.g., Burgio v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc.,
747 F. Supp. 865, 869-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying whole law of Louisiana,
the place of injury, including its choice of law rules, to question of damages
under the Federal Reservation Act). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8, Reporter's Note (1971).
170. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (noting that ex-
cept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by an Act of Congress,
the law of state should be applied).
171. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See In re Air-
crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., 948 F. Supp. 747, 753 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(discussing the split between the Second and Ninth Circuits on whether fed-
eral courts should apply the law of the forum or federal common law where the
courts' jurisdiction is based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Ward
Transformer Co., v. Distrigas of Mass. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 823, 824 (E.D.N.C.
1991) (relying on North Carolina's choice of law rules, the district court ap-
plied North Carolina's U.C.C. to enforce parties' choice of law clause under
U.C.C. § 1-105 and applied Massachusetts law to the litigation). See also
Chow, supra note 168, at 165-67 (discussing Erie's "powerful grip" which al-
lows states to make foreign policy decisions in violation of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.
172. See, e.g., Siegelman, 221 F.2d at 193-94 (applying traditional choice of
law rule lex loci contractus in deciding validity of choice of law clause in con-
tract printed on cruise ticket). At the time, this represented the rule under
the Restatement of Conflicts. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
332 cmt c. (1934). Lex loci contractus stands for the proposition that, "in the
absence of a choice of law provision in the parties' agreement, courts should
apply the law of the state in which the contract was made; that is, the state in
which the last act necessary to complete the contract was done." Fioretti v.
Mass. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 53 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying tradi-
tional choice of law rule of lex loci contractus to a case where an "impostor de-
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Indeed, Supreme Court opinions have set this out as one of
the duties of federal courts when deciding questions of federal
law.13 With respect to choice of law rules as they apply to clear
questions of federal law such as admiralty and maritime law, fed-
eral courts freely apply federal common law.' This is also true for
other matters of federal law such as water rights and other inter-
state transactions.'75 Federal courts have adopted the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflicts to decide choice of law issues based on
contractual relationships that arise in the context of federal law.'76
Where the Supreme Court is called upon to decide whether
the high court of a state has violated constitutional limitations in
applying its laws to a dispute, the Court will determine whether
the application of the forum's law was either "arbitrary or funda-
mentally unfair."'77 In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,'78 the
Court, in deciding the constitutionality of the state courts' applica-
tion of the law of the forum, looked at the contacts between the fo-
rum, the parties, and the underlying transactions.'79 The goal of
the Court's analysis was to determine whether the forum had a
fense" arose in an insurance contract enforcement action, subsequently apply-
ing New Jersey law to issue as the "last act necessary to complete the con-
tract" occurred in that state). "[Tihe basic assumption behind the lex loci con-
tractus doctrine is that when a contract is executed in a particular state, the
parties can be assumed to have intended to have that state's laws govern their
contractual relationship." Id. at 1236 n. 26.
173. See U.S. v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973)
(discussing the federal courts duty to interpret federal choice of law rules).
174. See Trautman, supra note 168, at 1719 n.14 (noting that suits concern-
ing admiralty and maritime law are governed by federal choice of law rules).
175. Id. at 1719 n.15.
176. See, e.g., Chuidian v. Phil. Nat'l Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 1992)
(involving a jurisdiction based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the
court applied the "most significant relationship" test to decide that Philippine
law governed the dispute). But see Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Avia-
tion of the P.R.C., 923 F.2d 957, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying state law
choice of law rules when exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act). And some federal courts avoid the question altogether by
finding that there is no true conflict between the federal common law and
state law. See In re Aircrash Disaster, 948 F. Supp. at 753-54, 755 n. 7 (declin-
ing to reach the question of whether federal common law choice of law or state
choice of law rules apply to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, where nei-
ther the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit had taken a position on this
question).
177. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (plurality deci-
sion) (deciding that Minnesota state courts' application of Minnesota law in
automobile insurance action did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause
or Due Process Clause where decedent was a Wisconsin resident who died in
an automobile accident). See generally Greenstein, supra note 53, at 1166-72
(discussing the development of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the con-
stitutionality of the application of forum law where another state has an inter-
est in having its own law applied to the dispute).
178. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313.
179. Id. at 308.
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"significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests with the parties and the occurrence or transac-
tion.,,180
V. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the preceding sections, this Article analyzed transactions
occurring wholly within the United States; but what about choice
of law issues arising in multi-jurisdictional transactions that occur
only partially within or totally outside of, the US? This concept is
termed "private international law" in the international context. 8 '
In the international arena "[a] choice-of-law rule is an institu-
tional choice among the substantive law among sovereign nation-
states."8 ' The revisions contained in the proposed U.C.C. choice of
law provisions is uniform with private international law, 83 includ-
ing the Inter-American Convention of the Law Applicable to Inter-
national Contracts, Article 7,18 the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, Article 7(1),185 and the EU Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Article 3(1).186 These
three conventions will be discussed in this section of the Article.
There are several sources of private international law rules,
including "national law, supra-national law such as European Un-
ion Directive or bi-lateral or multi-lateral treaties, and customary
international law."87 These sources are promulgated by several
law-making authorities, including international organizations that
180. Id.
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 822 (7th ed. 1999). See generally Ama S. Be-
koe, Note, The Illusory Choice: Examining the Illusion of "Choice" in Choice of
Law Provisions-A Country Study Exploring One Aspect of Foreign Investment
in the Caribbean, 42 HOw. L.J. 505, 508-09 (1999) (discussing the history of
private international law); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Pri-
vate International Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 1133 (2000) (analyzing how these two
divergent approaches can be combined to resolve choice of law issues in the
international context).
182. Ted Janger, The Public Choice of Choice of Law in Software Transac-
tions: Jurisdictional Competition and the Dim Prospects for Uniformity, 26
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 187, 188 (2000).
183. U.C.C. art. 1, Reporter's Note b (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
184. Organization of American States Fifth Inter-American Specialized Con-
ference of Private International Law: Inter-American Convention on the Law
of Applicable to International Contracts [hereinafter Mexico City Convention],
U.S.-Mexico, 33 I.L.M. 732 (March 17, 1994).
185. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of
Goods, 19 I.L.M. 668 (May 1980), reprinting UN Document A/CONF.97/18 of
April 10, 1980 [hereinafter "CISG"].
186. European Communities: Convention of the Law Applicable to Contrac-
tual Obligations [hereinafter Rome Convention], U.S.-European Communities,
19 I.L.M. 1492 (Nov. 1980).
187. Janger, supra note 182, at 189-90. See generally Bekoe, supra note 181,
at 509-30 (discussing several sources of private international law).
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promulgate and administer rules, 1 8 private organizations that rec-
ommend uniform laws that are then adopted by sovereign nation-
states, and nation-states themselves, either by prior agreement or
by the those nation-states' power to exercise jurisdiction over the
people or things governed by the rules.18
A. Mexico City and Rome Conventions
The Mexico City Convention governs international contracts
entered into by citizens of member states of the Organization of
American States. 90 The Rome Convention governs contracts (both
domestic and international) entered into by citizens of member
states of the European Economic Community.' Party autonomy
is a common feature in both the Mexico City and Rome Conven-
tions. '92 Articles 7 and 9 of the Mexico City Convention and Arti-
cles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention address choice of law issues.'8
Article 7 of the Mexico City Convention addresses treatment of
parties' choice of law clauses and authorizes courts to look to the
express words in the agreement as well as the parties' conduct to
determine whether they selected the laws of a particular jurisdic-
tion.'94 Article 3 of the Rome Convention addresses whether the
parties have made a choice of law selection.' Thus, both the Mex-
ico City and Rome Conventions adopt a U.C.C.-like definition of
188. For example, on December 17, 1966, the General Assembly of the
United Nations passed Resolution No. 2205, establishing the United Nations
Commission of International Trade Law. Official Records of the General As-
sembly, 21st Sess. U.N. Doc. A/6396 (1999).
189. Paul B. Stephan, Choice of Law and Its Consequences: Constitutions for
International Transactions, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 211, 214 (2000).
190. Mexico City Convention, supra note 184, at 733.
191. Rome Convention, supra note 186, at 1493.
192. Mexico City Convention, supra note 184, at 733; Rome Convention, su-
pra note 186, at 1492.
193. Mexico City Convention, supra note 184, at 734-35; Rome Convention,
supra note 186, at 1493.
194. Mexico City Convention, supra note 184, at 734. Article 7 provides:
The contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The
parties' agreement on this selection must be express or, in the event
that there is no express agreement, must be evident from the parties'
behavior and from the clauses of the contract, considered as a whole.
Said selection may relate to the entire contract or to a part of same. Se-
lection of a certain forum by the parties does not necessarily entail se-
lection of the applicable law.
Id.
195. Rome Convention, supra note 186, at 1493. Article 3 provides, in perti-
nent part:
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The
choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by
the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their
choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or a part
only of the contract.
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agreement in setting out rules for courts to use in determining
whether the parties made a choice of law selection.'96 Where the
parties have made a choice of law selection, it will be enforced,
even if the jurisdiction chosen bears no relationship to the transac-
tions. 197
As may be expected, both the Mexico City and Rome Conven-
tions address the situation where the parties have failed to incor-
porate a choice of law clause in their agreement."' Article 9 of the
Mexico City Convention addresses such a situation. In that situa-
tion, the law of the jurisdiction with the "closest ties" to the trans-
action applies.19' This test is similar to the intimate contacts test
used by some US jurisdictions. 20 0 Article 4 of the Rome Convention
addresses choice of law where the parties have not made a choice
of law selection.20 ' In that situation, the contract will be governed
by the law of the jurisdiction that "is most closely connected to the
con tra ct. "°2
Although not using the term "public policy," the Mexico City
and Rome Conventions contain provisions that would allow courts
or other tribunals to address public policy concerns when faced
with a dispute involving a choice of law issue. Article 11 of the
Mexico City Convention acknowledges that courts will apply the"mandatory requirements" of the forum, and grants courts the dis-
cretion to decide where to apply the "mandatory requirements" of
another jurisdiction that has "the closest ties with the contract." 3
Likewise, Article 7 of the Rome Convention acknowledges that
courts will apply the mandatory rules of the forum and authorizes
courts to apply the mandatory rules of a state with a "close connec-
tion" to the transaction. 64
Although the Mexico City Convention was modeled on the
Rome Convention,2 5 there are several significant differences be-
196. U.C.C. § 1-201 (2001). The U.C.C. defines "agreement" as "the bargain
of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circum-
stances, including course of dealing or usage of trade...". Id.
197. See Mexico City Convention, supra note 184, at 734, Art. 7 (following
the language of the Rome Convention and stating that the contract will be
governed by the law chosen by the parties). See also Rome Convention, supra
note 186, at 1492, Art. 3 (stating that the law chosen by the parties will govern
the contract).
198. Id.
199. Mexico Convention, supra note 184, at 735.
200. See Wright-Moore Corp., 908 F.2d at 132 (discussing Indiana's choice of
law approach).
201. Rome Convention, supra note 186, at 1493.
202. Id.
203. Mexico Convention, supra note 184, at 735.
204. Rome Convention, supra note 186, at 1494.
205. Friederick K. Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the Law Ap-
plicable to International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 AM.
J. COMP. L. 381, 382 (1994).
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tween the two. The Rome Convention has express provisions gov-
erning consumer transactions. Article 5 of the Rome Convention
provides that under certain circumstances, the provisions of the
Convention will not take away consumer protection laws of the
country of the consumer's residence.2 6 The Rome Convention also
2071hsets out special provisions for employment contracts. Unlike the
Rome Convention, the Mexico City Convention also allows courts
to apply "general principles of international commercial law rec-
ognized by international organizations." ' This allows courts to
rely on UNIDROIT principles.
B. UNIDROIT
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
is an independent organization whose purpose is to facilitate the
creation of a body of international commercial law rules.0, In
1994, UNIDROIT issued Principles of International Commercial
Contracts that parties to commercial contracts can use to govern
their agreements. ' ° These principles cover topics from contract
interpretation and formation to breach and remedies."'
C. CISG
The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sales
of Goods 2 ' (CISG), governs commercial transactions between the
parties who are citizens of Contracting States to the Convention.
The Convention explicitly exempts consumer transactions.2 1 1 Arti-
cle 7 incorporates by reference the principles of private interna-
tional law.2" The CISG sets out rules for interpreting interna-
tional sales of goods contracts and for resolving breaches of these
contracts.
206. Rome Convention, supra note 186, at 1494.
207. Id.
208. Mexico Convention, supra note 184, at 735. See also Juenger, supra
note 205, at 383-84 (discussing the provision in the Rome Convention that
"limit[s] the parties' choice to the positive laws of particular states and na-
tions. In other words, the freedom to choose authorized by the Rome Conven-
tion does not include a choice of, for instance, either such model laws as...
UNIDROIT Principles or the lex mercatoria").
209. See generally UNIDROIT, available at http://www.unidroit.org (last vis-
ited April 8, 2003) (describing the UNIDROIT principles).
210. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, available
at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/pr-main.htm (last visited Feb.
12, 2003).
211. Id.
212. CISG, 19 I.L.M. 668 (May, 1980) reprinting U.N. Document
A/CONF.97/18 of April 10, 1980.
213. Id. at 671-72.
214. Id. at 673.
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VI. PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Where the application of another jurisdiction's law would re-
sult in fundamental unfairness to the party who is the citizen of
the forum state, some jurisdictions use the public policy exception
to apply the forum's law to resolve the matter. 15 This exception
may be inapplicable to torts and contract cases. For tort cases this
exception may be unnecessary in light of the governmental inter-
est approach.216 In contracts cases, it may be unduly difficult to
identify the relevant public policies.1 7
Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts incorpo-
rates the public policy exception. Section 6 generally instructs
courts to consider the policies of the forum and other interested ju-
risdictions that are relevant to the issue presented, in the absence
of relevant statutory choice of law rules to which the forum court
must adhere.218 This approach is brought into section 187 when
courts use the Restatement (Second) to decide whether to enforce a
choice of law clause in an agreement. Comment g to section 187
analyzes which factors constitute the violation of a fundamental
policy of a state whose law would apply in the absence of the par-
ties' choice of law clause. 19 The Comment directs the court to de-
termine the relationship between the state chosen by the parties
and the transaction. The closer the relationship between the state
and the transaction, the "more fundamental" the other jurisdic-
tion's policy must be for the court to invalidate the parties' choice
of law clause.2 In addition, courts will only invalidate the parties'
choice of law clause where the jurisdiction whose laws would oth-
erwise apply to the transaction has a "materially greater interest
in the litigation than the ... chosen state."22' Although there are
215. See, e.g., Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, 520 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480,
484 (1987) (discussing the public policy exception, the burden of proof required
for the proponent to prevail, and why the exception may be outmoded). The
public policy exception initially "arose in order to ameliorate arbitrary or in-
appropriate results under" traditional choice of law approaches. Id. at 480.
216. Id. at 487.
217. See, e.g., In re Allstate Insur., 613 N.E.2d at 940. The Court noted that
[in] contrast [to tort cases], contract cases often involve only the private
economic interests of the parties, and analysis of the public policy un-
derlying the conflicting contract laws may be inappropriate to resolution
of the dispute. It may even be difficult to identify the competing 'poli-
cies' at stake, because the laws may differ only slightly, and evolve
through the incremental process of common-law adjudication as a re-
sponse to the facts presented.
Id.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
219. Id. § 187, cmt. g.
220. Id.
221. See Wright-Moore Corp., 908 F.2d at 132-33 (finding that Indiana had a
materially greater interest in having its laws applied to the litigation than did
New York, the state chosen by the parties in the choice of law clause).
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no immutable rules to determine exactly when a policy is a fun-
damental public policy, one guideline is that "a statute may em-
body a fundamental state policy if it is designed to protect a person
against the oppressive use of superior bargaining power."22
For example, the Seventh Circuit found such a fundamental
state policy in Indiana's franchise laws.2 3 The franchise laws pro-
hibited franchise agreements which required franchisees to waive
their protections under the franchise laws.224 Other jurisdictions
have enacted similarly worded code sections.2 5
One notable statutory contravention of the public policy ex-
ception doctrine is housed in the Texas party autonomy code sec-
tion. Under section 35.51(b), Texas courts must enforce parties'
choice of law clauses, even where that choice contravenes a fun-
damental public policy of a jurisdiction that could have its laws
applied in absence of the choice of law clause.2 6 The only require-
ment for this code section to apply is that the state chosen bears a
reasonable relationship to the transaction.2 7 The code section sets
out a five-part test to determine whether the jurisdiction bears a
reasonable relationship to the transaction. Section 35.51(d) pro-
vides:
For purposes of this section, a transaction bears a reasonable rela-
tion to a particular jurisdiction if the transaction, the subject matter
of the transaction, or a party to the transaction is reasonably related
to that jurisdiction. A transaction bears a reasonable relation to a
particular jurisdiction if: (1) a party to the transaction is a resident
of that jurisdiction; (2) a party to the transaction has its place of
222. Wallace Hardware Co., Inc. v. Abrams, 223 F.3d 382, 399 (6th Cir.
2000) (internal quotations omitted).
223. Wright-Moore Corp., 908 F.2d at 132-33.
224. Id. at 132 (citing IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-1(10))
225. See, e.g., Delaware Motor Vehicle Franchising Practices, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6 § 4917 (2002) (noting that the choice of law and choice of forum
provision explicitly overrides contractual choice of law clauses); Georgia Motor
Vehicle Franchise Practices, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-624 (2002) (stating that
"the applicability of this article shall not be affected by choice of law clause" in
a franchise agreement); Idaho Motor Vehicles Dealers and Salesmen Licens-
ing, IDAHO CODE § 49-1632 (2002) (stating that choice of law clauses will not
affect the applicability of this chapter to franchise agreements); See MINN.
STAT. ANN. §80C.21 (2002) (stating that a choice of law provision purporting to
bind a person acquiring a franchise to be operated in Minnesota is void);
(amended after an opinion by the Eighth Circuit in Modern Computer Sys.,
Inc. v. Modern Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 734, which held that Minnesota's
public policy of enforcing party choice of law clauses outweighed any public
policies contained in state's franchise laws); North Carolina Motor Vehicles
Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Law, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-308.2 (2002)
(stating that "the applicability of this Article shall not be affected by a choice
of law clause" in a franchise agreement); Wyoming Motor Vehicle Franchises,
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-124 (Michie 2002) (stating that "the applicability of
this Act is not affected choice of law clause" in a franchise agreement).
226. TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(b) (Vernon 2002).
227. Id.
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business or, if that party has more than one place of business, its
chief executive office or an office from which it conducts a substan-
tial part of the negotiations relating to the transaction, in that ju-
risdiction; (3) all or part of the subject matter of the transaction is
located in that jurisdiction; (4) a party to the transaction is required
to perform a substantial part of its obligations relating to the trans-
action, such as delivering payments, in that jurisdiction; or (5) a
substantial part of the negotiations relating to the transaction, and
the signing of an agreement relating to the transaction by a party to
the transaction, occurred in that jurisdiction."'
These factors are similar to those set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts section 188, which courts apply to determine
which state has the most significant relationship to the transac-
tion where the parties have failed to include a choice of law clause
in their agreement.229 These factors are also similar to those courts
use to determine whether a jurisdiction bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to a transaction as required by U.C.C. section 1-105. 230
It has been hypothesized that in some contexts, courts must
enforce parties' choice of law clauses in contracts, even where such
enforcement would violate the public policy of foreign jurisdictions.
"Section 5-1401 does not provide for any exceptions that would
permit a court to decline to enforce a choice-of-law clause if the
clause would infringe a fundamental public policy interest of the
conflicting jurisdiction. '231  Thus, under this theory, New York
courts would ignore the public policy prescriptions of Section 6(b)
of the Restatement (Second).232  However, recently courts have
opined that New York courts would invalidate the parties' choice
of law clause where "it was procured by fraud or where the issue is
of such overriding concern to the public policy of the other jurisdic-
tion as to override the intent of the parties and the interest of this
state in enforcing its own policies."23 3 The SG Cowen court posited
228. Id. § 35.51(d).
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
230. See U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 3 (2001) (analyzing the reasonable relationship
test under section 1-105).
231. Sun Forest Corp. v. Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (apply-
ing N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 to promissory notes); Supply & Bldg Co. v.
Estee Lauder Int'l, Inc., 2000 WL 223838 at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000).
232. See Friedler, supra note 51, at 512 (discussing potential impact on com-
ity in international transactions). Comity "is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of an-
other nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of it's own citizens or of other persons who are under the pro-
tection of its laws." Id. at 527 n.217 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-
64 (1895)).
233. See generally SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. Messih, 2000 WL 633434 (finding
that choice of law clauses are voidable if they conflict with the public policy of
the foreign jurisdiction). See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas
Containers Lines (UK) Ltd., 230 F.3d 549, 556 (2d. Cir. 2000) (stating that
New York courts will invalidate choice of law clauses only if the clauses con-
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that the parties' interest in having their expectations fulfilled is
not the only relevant factor in a court's decision of whether to en-
force a choice of law clause in an agreement; the interest of the
state whose law would apply absent the choice of law clause
should also be considered.234
Even jurisdictions that would uphold parties' choice of law
clauses that violate the public policies of foreign jurisdictions
might void such clauses if they were procured by fraud.2 ' A New
York appellate court has opined that "a choice of law provision
might be held invalid where it was procured by fraud ..
VII.CHOICE OF LAW UNDER THE REVISED U.C.C.
The proposed revised choice of law provision constitutes a
shift from the Code's existing choice of law rules for transactions
to the extent that they are governed by the substantive provisions
of the U.C.C.2 37 On its face, the most significant change is that the
new section 38 abandons the reasonable relationship requirement
for choice of law clauses to be enforceable, with the exception of
consumer transactions.24 ° Section 1-301(b) allows parties to trans-
actions, other than consumer transactions, to incorporate a choice
of law clause in their agreement selecting the law of any state they
choose.241' Thus, the parties may select a state that bears no rela-
tionship with the transaction. This change is in accord with the
state legislative enactments analyzed in Part II.A, which grant
parties leeway to choose the law applicable to their agreement and
direct courts to enforce such provisions in most cases. 42 However,
unlike most of those acts, the Revised U.C.C. does not set a mini-
mum dollar amount for transactions that the code section will gov-
flict with the public policy).
234. SG Cohen, 2000 WL 633434; but see Friedler, supra note 51, at 526-27
(suggesting that the jurisdiction's interest should be subordinated to the ex-
pectations of the parties).
235. See Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 223 A.D.2d at 123 (noting that a
choice of law provision procured by fraud might be held invalid).
236. Id. at 124 (finding no showing of fraud in instant case).
237. See Patchel and Auerbach, supra note 49, at 613. (noting that one of the
technical changes made to Article One, the General Provisions portion of the
U.C.C., was to make the scope of Article One more explicit).
238. U.C.C. § 1-301 (amended 2001).
239. See id. § 1-301(b).
240. Id. § 1-301(d).
241. Id. § 1-301(b). Under the Revised U.C.C., "state" would probably in-
clude Native American nations. See U.C.C. § 1-201(39a) (amended 2001) (de-
fining state as "State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States").
242. See supra notes 74, 76, 79, 81, 95, 100, 104 & 109 and accompanying
text (discussing various state statutes with provisions that allow parties to
agreements to choose the applicable law).
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ern. One of the underlying assumptions of the U.C.C., which is re-
flected in the proposed revised choice of law provisions, is that in
transactions between business entities the parties are sophisti-
cated with no significant disparity in bargaining power.243
For purposes of this choice of law section, where at least one
party is a consumer, the parties cannot select the law of a jurisdic-
tion that does not bear a reasonable relationship with the transac-
tion."' However, given the courts' hesitancy to find that a state
selected by parties to govern their transaction did not bear a rea-
sonable relationship, this arguably provides little real protection to
consumers. 2
45
The revised U.C.C. choice of law provisions do protect con-
sumers to some extent. First, the section maintains the reasonable
relationship requirement for consumer transactions.246 Second and
more importantly, the section provides that a choice of law clause
cannot strip consumers of the coverage of the consumer protection
laws of the jurisdiction where the consumer resides.247 An alterna-
tive to the rule that the place of residence governs for sales of good
contracts would allow the consumer to benefit from consumer pro-
tection laws of the jurisdiction where the consumer accepted deliv-
ery of goods, which could be the same jurisdiction as the con-
sumer's place of residence.248
The revised U.C.C. also changes the rule where the parties
fail to include a choice of law clause in their agreement. Instead of
the appropriate relationship test,2 49 the new provisions authorize
the court to apply the choice of law rules of the forum.25 ° In an ar-
ticle written by two members of the Article 1 Drafting Committee,
the authors explain that this change was made in part as a reflec-
tion of the fact that many courts "were ignoring the appropriate
relation test in favor of their general choice of law rules anyway." 251
The other reason for the change is that the Article 1 Drafting
Committee felt that jurisdictions no longer needed a "forum-
243. See PC COM, Inc. v. Proteon, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1125, 1138 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (analyzing the unconscionability argument and noting that "[niumerous
cases have found that 'the doctrine of unconscionability is not typically applied
to commercial dealings between business entities'"). The opinion later explic-
itly stated that the assumption of "sophisticated business entities operating in
a commercial context" was grounds for not applying the doctrine of uncon-
scionability. Id.
244. U.C.C. § 1-301(d)(1) (amended 2001).
245. See Evans, 983 S.W.2d at 950 (concluding that a reasonable relation
existed between Texas and the contract in question).
246. U.C.C. § 1-301(e)(1) (2002).
247. Id. § 1-301(e)(2).
248. Id. § 1-301(e)(2)(B).
249. Patel and Auerbach, supra note 49, at 612.
250. U.C.C. § 1-301(d) (2002).
251. Patel and Auerbach, supra note 49, at 612.
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favoring" rule as incentive to adopt the U.C.C.5 2 In a related
change, parties to an "international transaction," defined as one
bearing a "reasonable relation" to a nation other than the United
States, may chose the law of any nation, even one that bears no
relationship to the transaction.5 3
In addition, the revised U.C.C. explicitly incorporates the
public policy exception into the Code for the first time . It pro-
vides that courts should not enforce a choice of law clause if the
application of the chosen state's law would contravene "a funda-
mental policy" of the jurisdiction whose law would govern under
the choice of law rules of the forum state . 2 " Although not explic-
itly provided by section 1-301, authority exists to support the
proposition that the forum court may refuse to enforce a choice of
law clause where the application of the chosen law would contra-
vene a fundamental policy of the forum's jurisdiction, even though
application of the chosen law would not contravene a fundamental
policy of the jurisdiction whose law would apply absent the choice
of law clause..2 " The comments to revised section 1-301 state this
proposition. 57
The reference to the public policy exception however does not
fully placate the concerns of those commentators and scholars who
posit that the choice of law provisions such as those of the revised
U.C.C. violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause and thus are un-
constitutional.5 Furthermore, that courts have been reluctant to
252. Id. at 612-13.
253. U.C.C. § 1-301(b)(2)(amended 2001).
254. Id. § 1-301(e).
255. Id. This code section provides that "[a]n agreement otherwise effective
under subsection (b) is not effective to the extent that application of the law of
the State or country designated would be contrary to a fundamental policy of
the State or country whose law would govern in the absence of agreement un-
der subsection (c)." Id.
256. See Patchel and Auerbach, supra note 49, at 613 (noting that a forum
may refuse to apply the law selected by the parties when it would be contrary
to the forum's public policy).
257. U.C.C. § 1-301 (amended 2001).
258. See generally Greenstein, supra note 53, at 1172-74 (arguing that the
revised choice of law provisions would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause
in cases where the parties' choice of law clause selects the law of an state with
no relationship to the transaction). In that situation, the application of the
chosen state's law would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause as the cho-
sen state would not have a legitimate state interest in the transaction. Id. An
underlying assumption of this theory is that a state's interest in protecting its
status as a financial capital would not satisfy the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. See id. at 1173-74 (positing that general state interest is insufficient
as the Hague test required states to have an interest related to the dispute at
issue to satisfy Full Faith and Credit Clause); see also Kirt O'Neill, Note, Con-
tractual Choice of Law: The Case for a New Determination of Full Faith and
Credit Limitations, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1993) (positing that sovereign
interests' of states are not fully protected by Hague test); Barry W. Rashkover,
Note, Title 14, New York Choice of Law Rule for Contractual Disputes: Avoid-
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invalidate party choice of law clauses selecting the law of the fo-
rum... does not inspire confidence that the public policy exception
will become either a strong judicial protection for states' sovereign
260 efetvinterests, or an effective barrier against an abuse of superior
bargaining power by one party to an agreement.
CONCLUSION
One underlying assumption in the trend toward validating
party autonomy in choice of law is parity authority; the assump-
tion of power parity between parties to commercial transactions.
Much of the legislation mandating enforcement of parties' choice of
law clauses address perceived inequalities in parties' bargaining
power by carving out exceptions for consumer transactions and
other agreements, such as employment contracts and other per-
sonal service contracts, to protect individuals who are thought of
as tending to have lesser bargaining power. However, most of this
legislation, including the revised U.C.C. choice of law provisions,
do not consider unequal bargaining power between commercial en-
tities. Boilerplate choice of law clauses in adhesion contracts may
work an injustice on all parties in transactions who have lesser
power than the other parties to the agreements, not just consum-
ers. The concern over power imbalances was addressed partially
in section (d) of the proposed revision which provides consumers
some protection, especially with respect to the preservation of con-
sumer protection laws. However, small businesses and other or-
ganizations are not afforded such protections. Arguably, the un-
derlying assumption of parity in bargaining power does not apply
in some transactions involving these entities. As the revisions do
not contain a minimum dollar amount for the contract, transac-
ing the Unreasonable Results, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 227, 242 (1985) (positing
that the New York choice of law provision in section 5-1401 violates the Full
Faith and Credit Clause). But see Friedler, supra note 51, at 496-501 (discuss-
ing that the Supreme Court jurisprudence requires only minimal contacts with
the state and thus New York General Obligations section 5-1401 does not vio-
late the Full Faith and Credit Clause). See supra notes 94-96 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the reason New York state enacted its section 5-1401
choice of law provision).
259. See Elec. & Magnet Serv. Co., Inc. v. AMBAC Int'l Corp., 941 F.2d 660,
664 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that "it is harder to convince a court to ignore a
choice of law provision in favor of its forum law than it is to convince a court to
ignore such a provision selecting a foreign forum's law").
260. See Woodward, Jr., supra note 41, at 701 (discussing proposals elimi-
nating the requirement that choice of law clauses must select law of a jurisdic-
tion bearing a reasonable relationship to the parties). The transaction "will
erode ... State lawmaking power [to enact legislation to benefit its constitu-
ents] because an ordinarily applicable state statute or judicial precedent will
have to be characterized 'fundamental policy' before it will be recognized as
effective if parties otherwise subject to it have chosen different law in their
contract." Id.
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tions entered into by unsophisticated entities will be governed by
section 1-301. Placing a threshold amount into section 1-301, es-
pecially in states that have enacted, or plan to enact, general party
autonomy choice of law statutes with such thresholds, would re-
turn to these transactions some modicum level of court oversight
to remedy overreaching by parties with superior bargaining power.
